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A BRAZILIAN MUNICIPAL BOND 
MARKET: THEORY, REPRESSION 
AND PROSPECTS 
In 1890, Henry Adams 
lamented municipal corruption in 
the US caused by credit practices 
and compounded by a liberal 
bias against public finance that 
reproduced underdevelopment 
of local government and 
marginalized municipal managers. 
The development of a municipal 
bond market proved critical for 
reversing repression of local public 
finance, reducing corruption, 
sustaining growth and modernizing 
government. Over a century later, 
the US$3.2 trillion municipal bond 
market provided safe haven for 
investors in the US amidst the 2008 
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crisis and, as it has for decades, 
ensured access to long term capital 
for local governments and public 
entities. Deepening of local public 
credit and working toward a 
Brazilian municipal bond market 
provide similar opportunities to 
modernize municipal management 
and increase growth. This implies 
overcoming outmoded ideas 
about fiscal dominance, the need 
for recentralization and biases 
against local public finance that 
have predominated in Brazil 
since transition from military rule, 
reorganization of sub-national 
debt in 1997 (CENTRAL BANK OF 
BRAZIL, 2000), the imposition of 
fiscal responsibility legislation and 
hard won stability during the 1990s 
and 2000s (AFFONSO, 2003). Today, 
the repression of municipal finance 
is perhaps the single most important 
unrecognized cause of slow growth 
and disappointing politics and local 
public management in Brazil.
This paper presents three 
diagnoses and a proposal. The 
first diagnosis is that municipal 
finance underdevelopment is 
the most critical bottleneck for 
Brazilian economic and political 
development. The second diagnosis 
is that steps toward a Brazilian 
municipal bond market are politically 
and economically viable, timely 
and necessary to reap the rewards 
of reforms and modernization 
that have won investment grade 
ratings for sovereign and corporate 
issues. The third diagnosis is that 
municipal bond markets abroad 
provide sound guidelines and clear 
benchmarks to free more effective 
local finance and design a Brazilian 
market. The paper concludes with 
a proposed timeline for mobilizing 
ESSAYS
The great danger to self-government in the United States lies in municipal 
corruption, and municipal corruption is in large measure traceable to the 
manner in which cities have used their credit. 
The peculiar form of political corruption… is the flower and fruit of our 
generation, it is the natural result of endeavoring to manage a society 
according to the dogma of laissez-faire. This state of affairs, which is the 
growth of years, cannot be changed at once, but the evils complained of 
will certainly remain so long as we presume to think that the best thing 
to be done with a public officer is to lay him on a shelf out of the way 
of doing harm.
Adams, Public Debt, 1890, p. 25, 375Kurt von Mettenheim
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interested parties and the design 
and implementation of a Brazilian 
Municipal Bond Market 2012-16.
MUNICIPAL FINANCE 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IS 
THE ACHILLES HEEL OF 
BRAZIL
Despite all the advances of 
economic reforms, record 
capitalization of the BM&F-Bovespa 
market and creation of world-class 
financial regulation, the public 
sector and, especially, municipal 
finance have nonetheless been 
left behind. If recentralization 
(EATON; DICKOVICK, 2004) and 
fiscal dominance (BLANCHARD, 
2004) were mantras in the 
1990s, financial repression of 
municipalities and decentralization 
must be mantras for the 2010s. 
Military government and protracted 
transition did indeed leave state 
and municipal governments open 
to capture by traditional elites 
(HAGOPIAN, 2007). However, 
under constitutional government 
from1946-64, municipalities 
retained 10 percent of public 
revenue and were free to finance 
accordingly without requirements 
set by federal or state governments. 
Looking further back, the 
municipality of Santos financed 
construction of canals in the 1920s 
by sale of 30 year bonds in London 
at 5 percent interest rates (MAURO 
et al, 2006). Despite positive 
precedents from abroad and the 
past in Brazil, biases against public 
finance on the left and right have 
led to overemphasis on the private 
sector and repressed innovative 
local public finance management.
Figure 1 illustrates the structural 
trend downward in growth in 
Brazil that accompanied increases 
in private investment and private 
sector capital formation after the 
first oil shock in 1973. Instead, a 
clear correlation obtains between 
the decline of GDP growth and 
falling levels of public savings 
and public capital formation 
after the late 1970s. Statistical 
analysis is beyond the scope 
of this paper and many other 
factors for reduced growth are 
surely important (RODRICK, 2003; 
BRESSER-PEREIRA e GALA, 2007). 
However, the data on private, 
public and foreign savings and 
GDP growth 1948-2000 introduce 
our argument. The public sector 
has been left behind in Brazil. 
Overcoming constraints to growth 
requires new ideas about public 
sector finance.
Capital formation displays the 
same trend, as can be seen on 
Figure 2. Since decline of public 
capital formation caused by the 
crisis of the developmental state 
in the 1980s, increases in private 
capital formation have been unable 
to produce higher levels of growth. 
Other barriers to growth certainly 
matter. However, municipal finance 
development provides an untapped 
alternative policy agenda for 
modernization of the public sector, 
increasing growth, improving public 
management and encouraging the 
emergence of a new generation of 
market savvy political leaders in 
local government.  
The causes and consequences 
of slow Brazilian growth have been 
widely debated since fiscal and debt 
crises pervaded the end of military 
rule and transition to democracy in 
the 1980s. However, one observation 
seems clear. Brazil will be unable to 
sustain higher growth and financial 
deepening toward AAA ratings 
without modernization of municipal 
finance, where provision of most 
public services takes place and where 
participation of the private sector and 
public management modernization 
are most urgent. Underdevelopment 
of local public finance hamstrings 
growth and reinforces administrative 
centralization in state capitals and 
Brasilia, reproducing ineffective 
top down, command and control 
strategies of public management, 
increasing the cost of capital, 
decreasing the efficiency of the 
public sector and leaving private 
and foreign investment unable to 
improve local infrastructure. Since the 
1990s, price stability, privatizations, 
liberalization and modernization 
of regulatory authorities have 
transformed the BMF-Bovespa into a 
world class stock market. However, 
the concentration of fixed income 
instruments in a very few number of 
bonds from federal and select state 
government entities limits portfolio 
and risk diversification, runs counter 
to public finance paradigms and best 
practices abroad, and reproduces the 
financial repression of municipalities. 
The rigidity of top down mandatory 
transfers and the inability of local 
governments to tap capital markets 
reproduce inefficiencies and 
throttle innovation. Modernization 
of municipal credit and local 
government bond issues do indeed 
present risks such as crony credit 
and market bubbles. However, with 
sound regulation, transparent market 
valuation and controls, the work of 
credit rating agencies, banks and 
risk analysts, independent advisory 
services and the entry of new actors 
such as bond banks and insurance 
companies, as a whole, are capable 
of providing powerful incentives and 
premiums for innovative municipal 
finance management while vetoing 
unsustainable projects. Corruption essays    A BRAZILIAN MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET: THEORY, REPRESSION AND PROSPECTS
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will not disappear overnight. But 
municipal financial development 
provides an alternative to the current 
practice of exclusive reliance on 
costly prosecution of abuses by 
public prosecutors, lawyers, the 
judiciary and police forces. Municipal 
credit and bond ratings would 
function differently by offering 
premiums instead of punishment at 
much less cost to public authorities. 
A Brazilian muni market: 
necessary, timely and viable
Reforms in Brazil since the 
1990s provide a large window 
of opportunity to initiate a 
virtual cycle of municipal finance 
development with broad political 
support. Price stability (1994), 
liberalization of banking (1995), 
adoption of the policy tripod of 
inflation targeting, fiscal control and 
flexible foreign exchange (1999), 
capitalization of financial markets, 
mutual funds and fixed income 
instruments, and achievement 
of investment grade ratings for 
sovereign issues and companies; 
Brazil now retains the necessary 
ingredients to deepen municipal 
credit operations and create a 
municipal bond market. Somewhat 
paradoxically, because of repressed 
demand, high margins and the 
definition of new credit procedures 
for municipalities in place since 
2006, municipal finance is an 
easy-, almost self-starter. Brazilian 
banks, regulatory authorities and 
financial markets have achieved 
global standards in management, 
transparency, supervision, reporting 
and government-market relations. 
The modernization of municipal 
credit practices and the creation 
of a municipal bond market are 
fundamental to sustain financial 
development, increase the pace and 
quality of economic growth and 
deepen market confidence. 
Local governments required 
adjustment to the end of inertial 
inflation in 1994 (like banks, 
firms, and other agents in the 
economy). Price stability ended 
incentives to acquire debt and delay 
payment, but also left municipalities 
facing new fiscal realities. Fiscal 
reforms, spending reductions, 
administrative modernization and 
privatizations culminated in rigid 
fiscal responsibility legislation 
in 2000. Packaging local debts 
by the federal government from 
1997 through 2000-1 was initially 
favorable to municipalities but has 
become extremely onerous 15 years 
later because of high interest rates 
(CARVALHO et al, 2012; OLENSCKI, 
2008). Fiscal responsibility 
legislation dramatically improved 
local government accounting, 
budgeting and reporting standards 
during the 2000s. However, today, 
burdensome debt and excessive 
fiscal control now reproduce the 
financial underdevelopment of 
municipalities while reforms make 
change possible. Regulations 
and practices developed during 
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Figure 1 – Private, public and foreign savings 
& GDP growth, 1948-2009
Source: IBGE. Available on www.ibge.gov.br/seculoxx/economia/contas_nacionais/contas_nacionais.shtm
Note: The new IBGE National Accounts System omits foreign savings after 1999.Kurt von Mettenheim
ISSN 0034-7590 ©RAE  n  São Paulo  n  v. 52  n  n. 6  n  nov./dez. 2012  n  692-703     695
the 2000s such as pluri-annual 
planning procedures, annual 
budget laws and modernization 
of the independent registry for 
public sector credit operations 
(Sistema de Registro de Operações 
de Crédito com o Setor Público, 
CADIP) have improved municipal 
management and set the framework 
for financial development municipal 
governance. Moreover, Senate 
Resolution 43/2001 freed and 
Treasury and the Finance Ministry 
(in August 2006) introduced a 
new process for Central Bank, 
Senate and Treasury approval 
of new municipal credits. Since 
2006, a ‘Manual de Instrução de 
Pleitos de Crédito’ (Credit Request 
Instruction Manual) provides 
clear procedures and application 
forms online for proposal of credit 
operations. Municipalities currently 
may thereby contract loans from 
banks in Brazil or abroad up to 
120 percent of liquid receipts (STN, 
2006). In sum, reforms and this 
new regulatory framework have 
set clear procedures for deepening 
of municipal credit and make 
possible the next steps of financial 
modernization and launch of a 
Brazilian municipal bond market. 
However, underdevelopment is 
still marked. Only 18 municipalities 
in Brazil had loan contracts in 
2000 outside the consolidation 
of debts by federal government. 
Since then, public banks have 
begun, in very limited ways, to 
finance municipalities. Meanwhile, 
local government officials have 
struggled to work with limited 
tax capacity, rigid federal 
government transfers, complex 
credit regulations and budget 
controls, inability to customize 
credit operations and top down 
command and control governance 
from Brasilia and state capitals 
(OLENSCKI, 2008; GASPARINI; 
MIRANDA, 2006). Table 1 reports 
the shares of tax receipts and 
government funds received by 
the three levels of government in 
Brazil (federal, state, municipal) 
from 2006-2010. The municipal 
share of tax receipts increased from 
2.7 percent (in 1988, not in table) 
to 7.1 percent by 2010. Meanwhile, 
municipal share of government 
funds increased from 13.8 percent 
(in 1988, not in table) to 16.8 
percent by 2010. This indicates the 
current misalignment between tax 
authority and municipal budgets 
that leave local finance managers 
prisoner to requirements set in 
Brasilia mandating spending on 
health (12 percent), education (13 
percent) and other programs often 
summing to 100 percent of local 
government budgets (ALENCAR; 
GOBETTI, 2008).
The large number (5,564) and 
wide variety of municipalities in 
Brazil make the problem of rigidity 
in mandatory federal transfers 
and funds worse. However, this 
also suggests opportunities for 
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Figure 2 – Private and public capital formation 
& GDP growth, 1948-2009
Source: IBGE. Available on: www.ibge.gov.br/seculoxx/economia/contas_nacionais/contas_nacionais.shtm
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credit and finance operations. 
Big cities notoriously have big 
financial problems, in Brazil and 
abroad. São Paulo city alone was 
responsible for two thirds of the 
total value of municipal debt 
packaged in 2001, originating 
largely in shady operations from 
judicial deposits under Maluf-
Pitta administrations (OLENSCKI, 
2008). Municipal bankruptcies and 
debt renegotiations in the US also 
typically involve large cities such as 
New York in the 1970s and Orange 
County, California in the 1990s. 
However, the large number of mid-
sized municipalities in Brazil with 
independent tax bases provides 
sufficient scale to engender local 
credit and finance development 
by spreading risk for investors and 
providing many opportunities to 
diffuse innovative best practices 
of local finance officers through 
benchmark operations (See Table 2).
Federal transfers may 
straightjacket local governments. 
However, annual reporting 
to Treasury required by fiscal 
responsibility laws and federal 
fund transfers helped modernize 
municipal management.  
Municipalities currently manage 
federal fund transfers in health 
(Sistema Único de Saude, SUS), 
social assistance (Sistema Único 
de Assistência Social, SUAS), 
education (Fundo de Manutenção 
e Desenvolvimento do Ensino 
Fundamental, Fundef), agrarian 
reform (Fundo de Terras e da Reforma 
Agrária), poverty elimination 
(Fundo de Combate e Erradicação 
da Pobreza), participation 
funds (Fundos de Participação 
dos Estados e Municípios, FPM) 
(GASPARINI; MIRANDA, 2006), 
social development (Fundo de 
Desenvolvimento Social, FDS) 
and basic income (Programa de 
Garantia de Renda Mínima).
Municipalities have also 
explored new arrangements 
designed to tap private sector 
participation in local government 
through concessions, privatizations, 
sale of judicial deposits, public-
private-partnerships (PPPs), 
administrative reform and 
securitization of receivables. 
However, these arrangements 
have had very limited success 
in large part because innovation 
has been stifled by the burden of 
managing federal and state transfers 
and mandatory programs. The vast 
majority of municipalities have thus 
not secured credit operations and 
very few have capitalized policies 
by contracting credit up to the limit 
of 120 percent of liquid receipts 
permitted under current regulations. 
Current regulations and procedures 
thereby provide a compelling point 
of departure for the modernization 
of municipal finance.
In sum, Brazilian municipalities 
have recovered from capture under 
military rule and delayed transition 
to democracy. Municipalities 
began to modernize under central 
government control in the 1990s and 
adapted to rigid fiscal responsibility 
legislation and detailed budget 
reporting requirements during the 
2000s to manage a wide variety of 
funds and transfers mandated by 
federal government. Meanwhile, the 
value of municipal debt packaged 
by the federal government in 
2001 has exploded because of 
astronomic interest rates. A more 
realistic renegotiation of the 2001 
package is therefore another 
necessary step toward local public 
finance development (GIAMBIAGI 
et al, 2008).  
NEW PUBLIC FINANCE 
MANAGEMENT
Municipal credit operations and 
creation of a municipal bond market 
would reinforce the transition 
currently underway in Brazil away 
from old public management 
practices that keep capital 
costly, slow economic growth 
and cause conflicts over central 
% Tax Receipts % Government Funds
Federal States Municipal Federal States Municipal Total, R$ billion
2006 62.5 31.0 6.4 55.5 27.4 16.9    844.2
2007 63.2 30.2 6.5 56.5 26.7 16.7     970.3
2008 62.3 31.1 6.5 56.3 26.8 16.7      1,111.1
2009 60.6 32.3 7.0 54.4 27.5 18.0      1,148.3
2010 60.2 32.6 7.1 57.0 26.1 16.8      1,138,4
Source: Treasury Secretary.
Table 1 – Taxes and funds by level of government, 2006-2010Kurt von Mettenheim
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and state government transfers to 
municipalities. Municipal finance 
development and a Brazilian 
municipal bond market would 
accelerate the adoption of new 
public management techniques 
(SANO e ABRUCIO, 2008), bring 
greater transparency, financial 
advocacy, education and training 
and public-private collaboration 
and reinforce a virtuous cycle of 
public sector modernization. 
Perhaps most importantly, 
local public finance would help 
change local politics in Brazil along 
the lines indicated by Abrams 
in the epigram of this article. 
The modernization of credit and 
finance in local governments would 
free local finance secretaries to 
innovate and receive recognition for 
benchmark operations from markets 
by winning financial premiums 
and better ratings. Credit and 
finance provide cheaper means and 
powerful incentives in comparison 
to the costly, top-down, command 
and control methods of hierarchy 
and bureaucratic management 
that currently involves police, 
prosecutors, lawyers, judges in the 
interest of punishing municipal 
managers and imposing fiscal 
responsibility legislation. Frant 
(1996) described this as a difference 
between low-powered and high-
powered incentives in the public 
sector. The high-powered incentives 
of bank loans and municipal 
bond sales provide promising 
alternatives to the shortcomings of 
traditional public sector hierarchies, 
the high cost of command and 
control bureaucratic management 
techniques, the complexities of 
legal contests in courts, and political 
control over policy currently 
enforced on Brazilian municipalities 
(WILLIAMSON, 1994). 
Municipal finance development 
does not mean that anything goes. 
Core principles such as debt 
affordability, competitive sale, 
due diligence and disclosure, 
investor outreach, informed 
decision making by municipal 
finance managers, and services 
provided by independent financial 
advisory to avert conflict of interest 
are required to ensure prudent 
municipal debt management 
and avert moral hazard. Debt 
affordability requires the 
creation of independent advisory 
committees charged with writing 
annual reports on municipal 
budgets that publish calculation 
of debt serviceability scenarios. 
The principle of competitive sale 
is essential to ensure proper sale 
of bonds at market prices that 
may avert murky deals between 
local government officials, banks, 
investors or consortia. This ensures 
transparency and the lowest cost of 
finance for local governments. Due 
diligence and full disclosure require 
timely publication of the financial 
accounts of municipal assets and 
liabilities, permitting accurate 
credit ratings and pricing of bond 
values. Brazilian municipalities 
routinely report this type of 
information thanks to more than 
a decade of fiscal responsibility 
legislation and planning and 
budget requirements. Investor 
outreach implies communication 
and investor relation road trips 
to promote projects, loans and 
municipal bond issues. Informed 
decision making and independent 
financial advisory imply the 
representation of municipalities 
by financial specialists not linked 
to banks or investors to ensure 
against conflicts of interest in the 
issue of municipal bonds or signing 
of loan contracts. 
In sum, new public finance 
management seeks to harness the 
high powered incentives of markets 
to reinforce decentralization, 
democratization, transparency and 
accountability. Credit operations 
and bond issues would capitalize 
the public sector through issuer 
driven investor outreach and 
introduce a range of new services 
such as cost-benefit analysis, 
debt affordability analysis, capital 
planning, cash management, debt 
and finance policy analysis, use of 
new technologies of information 
000 residents Taxes Transfers Other
<2 1.8 93.4 4.8
2-5 2.6 92.5 4.8
5-10 4.1 89.9 5.9
10-20 4.8 89.4 6.0
20-50 7.4 83.4 9.1
50-100 12.5 75.4 12.0
100-200 14.3 69.2 16.4
200-500 20.9 62.7 16.3
500-1000 20.5 62.1 17.2
1000-5000 26.9 51.6 21.4
>5000 39.8 40.7 19.5
Source: IBAM, ‘Banco de Dados Municipais,’ 2007
Table 2 – Municipal size and tax capacityessays    A BRAZILIAN MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET: THEORY, REPRESSION AND PROSPECTS
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and communication and municipal 
finance education workshops. So, 
how to get there from here?  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
FROM MUNICIPAL BOND 
MARKETS ABROAD
Municipal bond markets abroad 
provide a wealth of references 
for Brazil. The US experience 
and case studies and comparative 
analyses of experiences of 
financial development of local 
governments in Eastern Europe 
and other emerging countries 
illustrate how Brazilian cities can 
explore opportunities.
United States
After municipal bonds contributed 
to and suffered from periodic 
crises under free banking in the 
US (1837, 1873, 1893), restrictions 
were imposed (STARNER, 1961). 
However, US sub-national debt 
nonetheless grew from 2.1-14.9 
billion dollars 1902-27 before 
downturns during two world 
wars and depression in the 1930s. 
After 1945, local public finance 
helped drive sustained growth, 
with ‘innovative diffusion’ of best 
practices and benchmark bond 
issues increasing the capitalization 
of local government entities from 
66.0 billion dollars in 1960 (sub-
national debt) to 399.4 billion 
dollars of municipal bonds by 1980 
(KATZMAN, 1980). Meanwhile, 
the problems experienced during 
the 19th century disappeared. 
Defaults on municipal bonds 
1941-90 remained below 1.1 
percent. The municipal bond 
market during this period became 
one of the safest markets for 
investors. The 2008 crisis disrupted 
the liquidity of secondary markets 
for US municipal bonds during 
2009 (FSOC, 2011:38). And the 
economic downturn produced 
by financial crisis has also placed 
stress on local government 
accounts and required adjustment 
(BERNANKE, 2011). However, 
municipal bonds recovered in 
2009 to near traditional spreads 
(80 points) over treasury bills 
to remain a safe haven for 
investors and inexpensive source 
of finance for local government 
entities. In sum, the US muni 
market has provided safe and 
sound investments for decades 
(HILDRETH; ZORN, 2005). 
To illustrate the stability 
and safety of the US municipal 
bond markets, Table 3 reports 
the capitalization of major types 
of bonds in US markets 1980-
2011. Municipal bonds (column 
1) retained a sustainable growth 
pattern 1980-2011 (from 0.4-3.7 
trillion US$) averting both the 
bubble and bursting of bonds such 
as mortgage backed securities (0.1-
8.4 trillion US$). The trajectory of 
municipal bonds also stands in 
contrast to the increase of Treasury 
issues from anti-crisis measures 
since 2008 to over 9.9 trillion 
US$. Moreover, despite alarm and 
pessimism during the adjustment 
of local government budgets to 
the US crisis since 2008, no major 
default of municipal bonds has 
been reported. 
Levine (2009) suggests that 
the following characteristics of 
the US municipal bond market 
are most relevant for municipal 
finance development in Brazil: 
Subsidies from US federal tax 
benefits to investors; clear and 
shared accounting standards set 
by the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB); a 
longstanding record of repayment; 
a decentralized tax system; legal 
clarity about priority liens for debt; 
liquid secondary market trading; 
oversight by a variety of regulatory 
agencies and authorities; and 
informed independent credit ratings 
of municipal governments and 
entities. The historical development 
and current structure of the US 
municipal bond market thereby 
provide a series of guidelines for 
municipal finance development 
in Brazil.
Eastern Europe
Experiences with issue of 
municipal bonds in Eastern Europe 
also suggest that clear limits on 
leverage, guidelines for prudent 
debt loads and conservative payout 
schedules, minimum enforceable 
disclosure standards (embodied 
in the US by SEC 15c2-12), use 
of annual amortization instead of 
balloon structuring, clear contracts 
for liens and recourse in case 
of non-payment for investors, 
establishment of transparent 
accounting presentation, and 
great care with initial operations 
to ensure success and provide 
benchmarks to accelerate diffusion 
are all critical lessons for Brazil. 
Eastern European experiences 
also suggest the importance of 
educating rating agencies, investors, 
banks, political leadership and the 
financial press to create advocacy 
networks that may become 
municipal bond communities. 
While small municipalities may not 
retain sufficient scale or experience 
for municipal bond issues, the 
pooling of credits and municipal 
consortia nonetheless provide 
alternative means for local public 
finance. Finally, municipal finance Kurt von Mettenheim
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development in Eastern Europe 
counsels beginning simple and 
small (by avoiding complex bonds 
or structures) and that enhancing 
the protection of investors by 
pledging revenue are critical. 
 
Emerging countries
Comparative studies of municipal 
bond development in emerging 
and developing countries also 
emphasize the importance of policy 
and tax devolution, the financial 
autonomy of local governments, 
the need for promotion of public 
finance modernization and the 
critical role of legal-regulatory 
frameworks. Martell and Guess 
(2005) report successful launches 
in South Africa, Poland, the 
Philippines and Mexico. Olenscki 
(2008:63-88) argues that Mexico 
was able to deepen municipal 
credit operations despite a shallow 
local tax base and many similarities 
with Brazil. Allen et al (2012) 
emphasize the importance of 
‘policy financial bonds´ in China. 
These bonds are issued by policy 
banks and held by Treasury, 
but invested locally similar to 
bonds in the US. International 
development banks have also 
reviewed experiences with projects 
designed to deepen local public 
finance (PETERSON, 1997; 2003)
RISKS AND MECHANISMS 
OF CONTROL 
Although further comparative analysis 
is required, these observations help 
clarify the challenges for municipal 
finance development in Brazil. 
The shallow tax base and rigidity 
of municipal budgets indicate the 
need for policy devolution. Credit 
to municipalities in Brazil is limited 
by regulations that cap loans at 120 
percent of liquid receipts and debt 
service at 11.5 of liquid receipts. 
However, as noted, this provides 
opportunities because few Brazilian 
municipalities use the financial space 
opened by rules established in 2006. 
Municipal 7 Treasury 1,6
Mortgage
Related 2,6
Corporate
Federal
Agency 5,6
Money
Markets 3
Asset
Backed 4,6
Total
1980 399,4 623,2 110,8 458,6 164,3 780,0 2536,4
1985 859,5 1437,7 396,7 776,6 261,0 847,0 1,2 4579,7
1990 1178,6 2195,8 1278,1 1350,3 421,5 1156,8 75,8 7656,9
1995 1268,2 3307,2 2352,7 1950,6 924,0 1177,3 257,0 11237,0
2000 1480,7 2951,9 3565,8 3358,4 1853,7 2662,6 1085,0 16958,1
2001 1603,4 2967,5 4127,4 3836,4 2157,4 2587,2 1230,3 18509,7
2002 1762,9 3204,9 4686,4 4132,8 2377,7 2545,7 1381,5 20091,9
2003 1900,4 3574,9 5238,6 4486,5 2626,2 2519,8 1507,6 21854,0
2004 2850,3 3943,6 5390,5 4801,6 2700,6 2904,2 1814,0 24404,8
2005 3044,2 4165,9 6161,8 4964,7 2616,0 3433,7 2111,0 26497,3
2006 3212,4 4322,9 7085,6 5344,2 2634,0 4008,8 2700,6 29308,5
2007 3448,0 4516,7 8161,1 5947,3 2906,2 4170,8 2946,4 32096,5
2008 3543,4 5774,2 8396,1 6198,6 3210,6 3790,9 2600,9 33514,7
2009 3698,0 7249,8 8506,9 6862,7 2727,5 3127,2 2326,9 34499,0
2010 3794,5 8853,0 8515,8 7511,9 2538,8 2866,5 2034,5 36115,0
2011 3743,3 9928,4 8440,0 7790,7 2316,6 2572,0 1815,4 36606,5
1  Interest  bearing  marketable  public  debt.         
2 Includes GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC mortgage-backed securities and CMOs, and CMBS, and private-label MBS/CMOs. 
3 Includes commercial paper, bankers acceptances, and large time deposits.               
4 Includes auto, credit card, home equity, manufacturing, student loans and other; CDOs of ABS are included
5 Due to FAS 166/167 changes, the GSE debt category in the Federal Reserve is no longer our source for agency debt going forward from Q1 2010.
Contains agency debt of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, FHLB, the Farm Credit System, and federal budget agencies (e.g., TVA) 
6  See  SIFMA  statistical  explanations         
7 Muncipal securities restated from 2004 onward and revised upward by about $840 billion.
Source:  SIFMA,  2012         
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Comparative studies of 
municipal bonds in developing 
and emerging countries also 
emphasize that municipal credit 
and bonds should be priced by 
risk and placed on markets by 
private parties as underwriters 
or lenders (MARTELL; GUESS, 
2006; BAHL; WALLACE, 2005; 
PETERSON, 1997). This requires 
risk assessment by financial 
institutions, banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds and 
securities firms. Municipal credit 
and bond sales also have proven 
critical for bringing greater clarity 
to the costs and benefits of 
alternative policies and subsidies. 
BNDES loans at lower interest 
rates may repress private finance 
to local governments. However, 
higher interest rates outside 
BNDES operations may encourage 
benchmark credit and bond issues 
(thereby attracting interest on the 
part of other banks and financial 
institutions). Moreover, convergence 
of SELIC (Sistema Especial de 
Liquidação e de Custódia, Special 
System of Liquidation and Custody) 
benchmark overnight interest 
rates set by government monetary 
authorities toward BNDES interest 
rates (Taxa de Juros de Longo 
Prazo, Long-Term Interest Rates, 
TJLP) also make private sector 
operations increasingly more viable. 
Studies of municipal bond 
development (OLENSCKI, 2008; 
BAHL; WALLACE, 2005) abroad also 
emphasize the importance of local 
accounting systems that support 
asset management techniques 
and regular reports to permit 
comparison of planned and actual 
expenditures as well as to better 
track budgets and debt schedules. 
Again, some smaller  municipalities 
remain behind fiscal and budgetary 
modernization. However, for the 
vast majority of municipalities, 
fiscal responsibility reports, pluri-
annual planning and annual 
budget laws now provide rich and 
accurate information sufficient for 
informed analysis of expenditures 
and debt.  Reforms thus permit 
the evaluation of municipal 
projects according to economic 
criteria and the development 
of capital programming and 
budget procedures through cost-
benefit analysis and present value 
estimates.
 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Modernization of local public 
finance is also fundamental for 
political development. During 
the last decade, consensus has 
emerged that negotiation of multi-
party coalitions at federal, state 
and local levels is perhaps the most 
critical problem for governance in 
Brazil. The underdevelopment of 
local public finance transforms 
coalition formation and budget 
politics into zero-sum disputes, 
often involving use of amendments 
to steer funds toward preferential 
projects. The short time horizons of 
disputes over annual budgets lines 
imposed by fiscal responsibility 
legislation also reinforces the zero-
sum character of conflicts between 
legislatures and executives. 
Lowering the stakes increases the 
irresponsibility of local public 
management. 
Deepening of municipal credit 
and finance presents the prospect 
of more positive sum collaboration 
and high-powered incentives 
based on access to capital 
markets and the private sector. 
New public finance management 
offers an alternative to command 
and control strategies, costly 
bureaucratic review and expensive 
prosecution through accounting 
courts and the judiciary. Credit 
and finance use market contracts 
as powerful incentives and credit 
ratings as premiums to reduce 
the transaction costs of municipal 
management. Benchmark credits 
and municipal bond ratings would 
build on a decade of reporting 
to Treasury required by fiscal 
responsibility legislation. Instead 
of being ‘placed on a shelf out of 
the way’ as described by Adams 
in the epigram to this article, 
municipal finance officers in Brazil 
would be free to innovate and 
gain recognition from markets, 
fellow politicians and voters. This 
modernization of local public 
finance and the deepening of credit 
and bond markets were critical 
for reducing corruption in US 
municipal governments. We argue 
that it may be so in Brazil also.
Proposal: Brazilian Municipal 
bond market
Recognition is now widespread that 
Brazil has introduced a series of 
successful economic and financial 
reforms and created world class 
regulatory frameworks, institutions 
and markets in banking and 
finance. Nonetheless, repression 
of local finance has made Brazil 
miss opportunities to direct capital 
movements toward public sector 
modernization and further increase 
the confidence of investors. The 
deepening of local public credit 
and taking steps toward a municipal 
bond market would tap recent 
reforms and free local finance 
officers to innovate. Fortunately, the 
record high interest rates of Brazil 
appear to be converging toward 
more viable international standards. Kurt von Mettenheim
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The timing for municipal finance 
could not be better. The current 
still very high interest rates of 
Brazil imply large marginal returns 
for startup and benchmark credit 
operations. We estimate the market 
for municipal credit within current 
caps of 120 percent liquid receipts 
and 11.5 percent of debt obligations 
at over six billion reals. Financial 
space therefore exists to increase 
the transparency, accountability, 
decentralization and modernization 
of the public sector at its most 
critical point – in the 5,564 local 
governments across Brazil. 
This would help reverse the 
brain drain of talented managers 
to the private sector, increase the 
capacity of banks to deal with 
public finance and deepen credit 
and capital markets in Brazil. 
Municipal bonds are the missing 
piece to crown development of 
BM&F-Bovespa fixed income 
markets. This requires change. 
And while many challenges exist, 
it should be remembered that 
innovative credit and finance can 
quickly diffuse through relational 
finance management and pre-sale 
and post-sale events for education 
and training. This, in turn, would 
lead to additional loans on better 
terms that would further reduce the 
cost of capital for municipalities. 
Local finance modernization 
would also contribute to further 
improvement of Brazilian sovereign 
and corporate risk ratings. 
The challenges and timeline 
for overcoming the separation of 
local governments from capital 
markets are summarized in Figure 
3. This figure represents paths for 
municipal finance development 
based on experiences in other 
developing and emerging 
countries. Changes to the legal and 
regulatory framework of financial 
markets are indicated by ‘a’ arrows. 
Changes at government financial 
intermediaries are indicated by 
‘b’ arrows. Changes in municipal 
finance management are indicated 
by ‘c’ arrows. Brazil currently 
remains in the first column on 
the left, where local governments 
rely almost exclusively on 
central government transfers, 
direct grants or lending from 
federal government banks. The 
second column indicates the role 
of government intermediaries 
that may bring capital markets 
and investors together with 
subnational governments to 
regulate and mobilize credit and 
finance to municipalities. The third 
column represents the mature 
market for municipal bonds that 
permits the removal of direct 
central government control and 
intermediation by public programs 
from municipal finance. The 
timeline below the figure represents 
how mobilization of municipalities 
through representative associations, 
modernization of bank divisions 
responsible for public sector 
finance, removal of constraints 
in the 2001 debt pact, revision of 
CVM and BOVESPA regulations, 
and education and training may 
reverse decades of bias against 
municipal finance management 
during 2013-16.  
CONCLUSION
A Brazilian Municipal Bond 
Market is the missing ingredient for 
Figure 3 – Challenges for municipal finance development
Investors Investors Investors
Private 
capital markets
Private 
capital markets
Private credit /
capital markets 
for subnational 
governments
Government 
financial 
intermediaries Central government 
direct grants /
lending
Subnational 
government
Subnational 
government
Subnational 
government
a a
a a
b
b
c c c
Timeline:         2012  2013            2014       2015                2016
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modernization of local government, 
political development and financial 
deepening. The 2008 financial crisis 
has led to reassessment of private 
sector biases and reflection on the 
excesses of deregulation. However, 
crisis in the US has also proved 
once again the solidity of municipal 
bonds and their importance for long 
term finance in many advanced 
economies. This article points 
to an anomaly and presents a 
proposal. The anomaly is that, 
despite profound advances in Brazil 
during the last decades, perceptions 
of fiscal dominance and repression 
of local public finance continue to 
reproduce economic and political 
underdevelopment. Fiscal controls 
were indeed necessary to secure 
adjustment to price stability in the 
1990s. However, administrative 
centralization and fiscal control 
have impeded modernization of 
local government finance, slowed 
growth and stifled more dynamic 
political leadership at the local level. 
The importance of municipal bonds 
and credit abroad suggests that 
financial deepening and political 
and economic development in 
Brazil will fail to advance without 
rethinking local finance. The 
history of municipal finance in 
mature markets and recent efforts 
abroad to deepen local government 
finance in emerging, developing 
and transition economies suggest 
that, like past periods in Brazilian 
history, municipalities need 
access capital markets to remove 
bottlenecks and address legacies of 
underdevelopment. The proposal 
is to mobilize interested parties to 
spread best the best practices of 
local credit operations and new 
public finance management to 
pave the way for a municipal bond 
market in Brazil.
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